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DISSEMINATION MUST SERVE AUTHORS: HOW THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT ERRED
WENDY J. GORDON
Abstract. The US Congress has enacted expansions of copyright which ar-
guably impose high social costs and generate little incentives for authorial
creativity. When the two most expansive statutes were challenged as un-
constitutional, the US Supreme Court rebuffed the challenges, partly on the
supposed ground that copyright law could legitimately seek to promote non-
authorial interests; apparently, Congress could enact provisions aiming to sup-
port noncreative disseminative activities such as publishing, or restoring and
distributing old film stock, even if authorial incentives were not served. Such
an error might have arisen because of three phenomena (in economics, history,
and law, respectively) that might easily be misunderstood but which, when
unpacked, no longer lead plausibly to a stand-alone embrace of disseminator
interests. The purpose of this article is to analyse and comment on this error
from several relevant points of view.
1. Introduction: The error of the Supreme Court
In 1998, the United States Congress extended the already long copyright term
by another twenty years. Challengers to the statutory extension brought lawsuits
claiming that the extension was unconstitutional and thus invalid. In support
of such a challenge, seventeen noted economists, including five Nobel laureates,
signed a brief submitted to the Supreme Court (see Akerlof et al., 2003). In this
nearly unprecedented document, the economists jointly stated that the then-recent
extension of copyright term in the US could not appreciably increase incentives to
authors (Akerlof et al., 2003, pg. 2).
By implication, the economists’ brief backed the common wisdom: that when
the American Congress extended copyright from life of the author plus fifty years to
life-plus-seventy, the goal was not to encourage new authorship; rather, the industry
actors who primarily stood to benefit were downstream copyright holders, primarily
companies like Disney that profit by exclusive control over the dissemination of
authorial works created long ago. The statute in question, formally known as
Copyright c° by Wendy J Gordon 2013. For comments on this essay Prof. Gordon is grateful
to Jessica Litman, Jessica Silbey, Rebecca Tushnet, and Richard Watt; to BU’s Stacey Dogan,
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2 WENDY J. GORDON
the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), or the “Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Extension Act”,1 was even jokingly referred to as the Mickey Mouse Protection Act
(Mickey, a copyrighted cartoon character, was ‘saved’ from the public domain by
the enactment of term extension, and the owner of Mickey’s copyright, Disney, had
been very active in lobbying for the extension when it was adopted2).
A majority opinion of the Supreme Court nevertheless upheld the CTEA (Eldred
v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 2003). In doing so, the Court exhibited some unease with
the economists’ brief. The majority opinion indicated that even if a statute doesn’t
help authorial incentives, it might be valid if it encourages noncreative behavior
that helped knowledge and the arts to progress.3 For an example, in Eldred (537
U.S. at 206-7) the Court cited the way that term extension might encourage some
companies to take old films out of mothballs and physically restore the film stock.
In the cited passage, the majority opinion states that Congress had “rationally
credited projections that longer terms would encourage copyright holders to invest
in the restoration and public distribution of their works” (citing inter alia H.R.Rep.
No. 105-452, at 4 (1998)).
This twist of reasoning stunned me. Only a few years earlier, in the famous Feist
case, the same Court had decided that copyright could not extend to noncreative
compilations, no matter how much in need of incentives the compilation-maker
might stand.4 In Feist the Court had held that only creative works were within
the legitimate range of Congressional concern under the Constitution’s copyright
clause.5
Then, in Eldred, a bare eleven years later, the same Court was saying that even
although Feist was right (that Congress and courts could not grant copyright to
noncreative works), Congress could use noncreative activity to justify rules about
how creative works were handled.6
1http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/s505.pdf (naming the statute after Sonny Bono, a com-
poser, performer, and Congressman).
2See, for example the article in the Chicago Tribune, October 17, 1998 (page 22); “Disney Lobbying
for Copyright Extension No Mickey Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators 20 More
Years”.
3Federal power to enact copyright legislation is granted by U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, sometimes
known as the Copyright and Patent Clause or the Intellectual Property Clause. It provides that
“The Congress shall have Power to . . . promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.”
4Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 359-60 (“orig-
inality, not ‘sweat of the brow,’ is the touchstone of copyright protection in directories and other
fact-based works.”).
5The court held that Rural’s telephone directory was not copyrightable because the “age-old
practice” of alphabetical arrangement “does not possess the minimal creative spark required by
the Copyright Act and the Constitution”.
6See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 206-7, where it is explained that encouraging noncreative “restoration
and. . . distribution” was a valid purpose of the CTEA.
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The two cases presented questions that weren’t technically identical — Feist dealt
with works that were noncreative in their inception, while Eldred dealt with works
that were creative in their inception.7 Nevertheless the holding of Feist seemed to
me then, and seems to me now, totally opposed to the essence of the holding of
Eldred.
What was the result of the Eldred Court upholding the extension of copyright for
another twenty years? People who wanted to copy and adapt works made between
1924 and 1944 — people who stood ready to post digital versions of those works
or to build new creative works out of the old materials — were burdened with an
obligation they would not otherwise have had. They could not carry out their plans
without seeking out and obtaining the permission of the copyright holders.
This became particularly bad news for efforts like Google Books, which seeks to
digitize entire libraries: after term-extension and Eldred, thousands of old, about-to-
be available books could not be digitized without permission. As another example,
the New York Public Library’s efforts to digitize a donated collection of over twelve
thousand items relating to the New York World’s Fair of 1939 and 1940 were bur-
dened by a “time consuming and, ultimately, fruitless” effort to locate extant rights
holders.8 This vain search would not have been necessary but for the increased
copyright term upheld in Eldred. Similarly, efforts to make publicly available the
recently discovered Savory record collection, a “cultural treasure” comprised of ap-
proximately “a thousand discs of the greatest [1930s jazz] performers of all time”
that do not exist anywhere else, have been outright thwarted due to search costs
and liability exposure created by the CTEA (see Seidenberg, 2011). Since many
of these (dubbed “orphan works”) had copyright owners who could no longer be
identified or located, only a risk-loving actor would dare make copies of them.
That in sum was the Eldred case, in which the US Supreme Court upheld an
extension of copyright term (Eldred, 537 U.S. at 194). In it the Court’s discussion of
film stock restoration and other noncreative disseminative activities was disturbing,
but at least the discussion left a bit of doubt whether such activities standing alone
could justify a statute enacted pursuant to the Copyright Clause. I therefore still
had some hope that the Court didn’t really mean that a copyright statute which
7I am indebted to Jane Ginsburg for pointing this out.
8From a letter from Ann Thornton, Andrew W. Mellon Director of the New York Pub-
lic Libraries, to Karyn Temple Claggett, Associate Register of Copyrights, United States
Copyright Office, re: Reply Comments to Orphan Works and Mass Digitization: No-
tice of Inquiry (77 F.R. 204) (Docket No. 2012-12) (March 6, 2013). Available at
http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/comments/noi_11302012/New-York-Public-Library.pdf).
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prevented works from falling into the public domain could be upheld simply because
it assisted noncreative activity.9 More recently, my hope was largely snuffed out.
In Golan v. Holder, decided last year, the Court addressed the question of
whether Congress exceeded its power when it enacted a remarkable US statute that
pulled works out of the public domain and put them back into private hands (Golan
v. Holder, U.S. 132 S. Ct. 873, 878, 2012).10 The Court upheld the statute. In doing
so, the majority opinion indicated unequivocally (though over vigorous dissent)
that Congress could, in carrying out its Constitutional mandate to “promote the
Progress of Science,” legitimately enact provisions extending copyright’s reach even
if the statute’s sole effect would be to aid only noncreative disseminators.11 Wrote
the majority, ‘The provision of incentives for the creation of new works is surely
an essential means to advance the spread of knowledge and learning. We hold,
however, that it is not the sole means Congress may use “[t]o promote the Progress
of Science.”’ (See Golan at 889).12
Only a historian can tell us what the Framers intended, and so far the historians
have not reached consensus on this point. But the constitution and our initial
and successive copyright statutes speak in terms of protecting authors. Even the
English Statute of Anne, which was probably enacted at the urging of disseminator
interests (the Stationers’ Company), gives rights only to authors. Further, the
Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Golan is a sharp departure from centuries of
understanding. It is the traditional understanding — that copyright is for “authors”
— to which I adhere.
9Compare, for example, 537 U.S. at page 195, stating that Congress had a legitimate purpose in
encouraging film restoration, with 537 U.S. at page 227 emphasizing the “overriding purpose of
providing a reward for authors’ creative activity”.
10The Court upheld 17 U.S.C. § 104A, which had been adopted to further US compliance with
the Berne Convention. Under Berne, member nations cannot condition copyright ownership on
compliance with formalities; yet under earlier U.S. law, many works over the years had entered the
public domain because of a failure to comply with then-required U.S. formalities such as placing
a prescribed form of copyright notice on all published copies of a work. Section 104A allowed
restoration of copyright in some of the non-U.S. works that had lost copyright in this way.
11See Golan v. Holder at 888; “Nothing in the text of the Copyright Clause confines the ‘Progress
of Science’ exclusively to “incentives for creation. . . Evidence from the founding, moreover, suggests
that inducing dissemination — as opposed to creation — was viewed as an appropriate means to
promote science.”
12Note the institutional solecism of the language. Courts do not ordinary “hold” what a legislative
purpose is. Rather they “hold” that a piece of legislation is or is not valid. Yet the Court here
“holds” that legislative purpose contains a particular policy. Such a “holding” is a scholarly
contention, not a rule of law. As such, it is no more binding than any other statement of rationale.
In the common-law system, at least in practiced in the US, consistency of results is more important
than consistency of rationale. Therefore, the US Supreme Court is less bound by this purported
‘holding’ than may appear.
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In this short essay I will indicate some of the reasons why the Supreme Court
and even some of my scholarly colleagues13 might have stumbled into what I see as
an error, and some of the reasons why I think their new interpretation erroneous.
2. Why the error arises
Why does dissemination appear plausible as a legitimate purpose of copyright?
First and most obviously, copyright makes dissemination easier, and dissemination
is a requisite for Progress to occur. Creativity concealed makes little contribution
to the public wealth. Second, both history and contemporary experience show
that publishers and other disseminators profit from selling copyrighted works, and
that they are active in lobbying for copyright. Third, many copyright doctrines —
ranging from now-extinct doctrines that gave special importance to publication, to
still-valid rights such as the ‘right to distribute’ — give importance to dissemination.
Given all this, the Supreme Court’s error is not surprising. But the nature of the
error and the weakness of its foundations can be revealed fairly straightforwardly. I
will first address the analytic issue of dissemination’s economic importance and its
role in furthering Progress. Second, I will briefly review the history and experience
of publisher involvement in copyright. Third, I will examine the provisions of
statute and doctrine that seem to privilege disseminators. It will become clear that
disseminators are honored in copyright only for the purpose of assisting authorial
incentives.
3. Economic analytics and the Arrow information paradox
Economic analysts sometimes describe copyright law as a compromise between
its positive effect of inducing initial creativity, and its negative effect of reducing
dissemination. The negative effect arises because, once a work is created, copyright
enables the work to be priced above marginal cost and thus reduces the number of
copies disseminated. If each copy were priced at marginal cost, by contrast, more
people would buy copies than they buy at the higher, copyright price; every person
who values a copy above marginal cost but below actual price does without. That
consumer then shifts his or her purchase to a less-desired resource, giving rise to
the social burden of ‘deadweight loss’.
13See, e.g., Barnett (2013), who argues that “[c]opyright is best conceived. . . as a system for
incentivizing investment by the intermediaries responsible for undertaking the capital-intensive
tasks required to deliver a creative work from an individual artist to a mass audience”; Cohen
(2007), who concludes that a good copyright system must take into account goals other than
encouraging creators, such as the “control of copying, manipulation, and derivation” exercised
by disseminators, which “enables the organization of entire sectors of economic activity in ways
that produce a variety of concrete benefits, ranging from jobs and exports to an independent
expressive sector to cultural ‘solidarity goods”’. Also see Pollack’s (2001) meaning of “Progress”
in the Copyright Clause.
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Determining the extent of the deadweight loss is complex and difficult, even if
one were to overlook the empirical problems of gathering data. Stan Liebowitz (see
Liebowitz, 1986, and also the discussion in Gordon, 2002) has provided the best
graphical depiction of the conceptual complexity;14 at its center lies the perception
that copyright produces pure social gain for those works that would not have arisen
but for copyright’s incentives. Deadweight loss arises only as to works that would
have been produced in the absence of copyright, or would have been produced in
the presence of a much shorter (or otherwise more limited) copyright. Much lively
debate surrounds the question of what kind of fine-tuning copyright needs in order
to ensure that social gain exceeds social loss.
One thing that has emerged from the debate is a clear recognition that although
copyright can reduce the number of copies held by the public, it can also aid dissem-
ination. This is a central point made early by Richard Watt’s book (Watt, 2000)
on copyright economics: that the so-called tension between incentives and access is
overstated. Like any sort of property, copyright can, in the right circumstances, fos-
ter access and dissemination. The prospect of above-marginal-cost pricing entices
publishers who might not otherwise take the risk to engage in distributing creative
works to the public.
The pro-dissemination function of intellectual property law is highlighted by the
Arrow information paradox. Arrow’s story goes roughly like this: The creative
person has an inventive idea which is potentially profitable; to find someone to
disseminate the idea, the creative person must reveal the idea; in the absence of
legal protections, a potential disseminator could walk off with the idea without
paying; the prospect of losing the idea to the potential disseminator would keep the
creative person silent; lacking information about the content of what he or she is
expected to pay for, the potential disseminator would refuse to license or buy; and
the idea would go undisseminated. Ergo (it is said), intellectual property rights
(IPR’s) are needed to give the parties a way to escape the paradox: IPR’s enable
the creative person to disclose the idea without fear that the potential disseminator
will be able to refuse a deal yet walk away to profit from the creative’s idea.
Needless to say, even if the Arrow paradox exists in some situations, it does
not ‘prove’ a need for intellectual property. At most it proves the need for some
kind of legal protection, and personal rights (arising out of in personam doctrines
such as breach of confidential relations and quasi-contract) are often adequate to
discourage disclosure after negotiations fail. Personal rights pose much less threat
to public liberty than do in rem property rights such as patent and copyright. In
addition, Michael Burstein (Burstein, 2013) and others show that legal protection
14Liebowitz makes clear that deadweight loss isn’t all-or-nothing. Deadweight loss will vary across
a range of different works.
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against uncompensated disclosure can even be rendered unnecessary by many non-
legal devices (such as piecemeal disclosures during negotiations, or there being a
high level of know-how required before an idea can be effectively exploited).
Moreover, the Arrow paradox has much more force when applied to inventor-
ship (the domain of patent law) than when applied to authorship (the domain of
copyright law). If we follow William Baumol’s advice to this very forum (Baumol,
2005) and apply the Arrow paradox to authorial works, we find that the disclosure
paradox has much less applicability than it did to inventions.
Inventions are typically inputs to other products, such as providing those prod-
ucts an improved method of manufacture. Inventions can, for example, reduce the
cost of production (consider the cotton gin) or increase the quality of the output
(consider the invention of coca cola’s taste). Therefore an inventor who lacked
post-disclosure protection for ideas might be able to avoid disclosure entirely. The
inventor might instead use his or her invention behind closed factory doors to pro-
duce the ultimate product at a reduced price or improved quality, and not need to
sell — or disclose — the invention itself.15 So for inventions, legal protections such
as patent can make the crucial difference in the decision whether or not to disclose
the idea.
By contrast with inventors, authors typically have no option of using their ideas
without disclosing them. If authors produce an input, e.g., a composer preparing
a score for use in a movie soundtrack, the input is valuable only if is disclosed;
the music must be heard when the movie plays. It’s conceivable I suppose that
novelists, painters and singers might sometimes produce concealable inputs (as do
the writers of computer programs, who are generally seen to be an exception to the
whole statutory scheme),16 but usually what creative authors produce are either
inputs meant to be expressed, like the score for a movie, or the ultimate products
themselves — the novel, the graphic design, the symphony. The primary ways to
profit from such things are to publish, distribute, or perform them — leaving the
creator forced to disclose to the public if he or she is to profit at all.17
Having little ability to profit without disclosure, creative persons who lacked
rights to control post-disclosure use would nevertheless be forced by economic ne-
cessity to disclose and take their chances.18 Thus, applying the Arrow analysis to
15Trade secrecy law can be important in making the produce-it-yourself option practicable.
16In the U.S., computer programs receive copyright protection, albeit narrow protection, on the
theory that computer programs are ‘authored’ works. In many ways, programs are unsuited for
copyright, being atypical in many ways from traditional creative works — most obviously, in being
functional components of machines. The classic source here is Samuelson et al., (1994).
17I suppose another route is to have the luck to find a very rich and eccentric individual collector.
18The same might apply to inventions that cannot be kept secret because, for example, they
disclose their secrets on their face — consider the safety pin. As to such inventions, trade secrecy
law is unavailable. In such cases, the inventor has as strong a desire for post-disclosure rights as
does an author, and would feel the same pressure to disclose despite the absence of IPR’s.
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copyright-industry circumstances shows that a right to control post-disclosure dis-
semination of ideas tends to be more important for inventors (who will conceal if
they cannot control disclosure) than it is for authors (who cannot afford to conceal).
The analysis suggests that IPR’s give society more when inventions are involved
than IPR’s give to society when the subject matter is authorial work.
Nevertheless, even for authorial works dissemination is sometimes assisted by
copyright. Copyright increases the profit from selling authored works, and thus
encourages publishers to take the risk of paying authors for permissions. Whether
we still need as much encouragement to publishers as we used to need is an open
question — copyright certainly seems less necessary for dissemination in a world of
easy digitization and virtually free dissemination by internet. But investigating
that question would take us too far away from my central thesis.
So: let’s assume that copyright makes it easier for disseminators and authors to
make deals, and that these deals are welfare-enhancing. How do they enhance wel-
fare? Predominantly by encouraging publishers to pay authors, either for licenses
or assignments. And the prospect of payment induces more creative activity. One
might say that the primary claim that publishers have to payment via copyright is
as an ‘agent’ of the author with whom they have made a contract.19
Later I will examine what other, subordinate claim publishers might have. But
for now, just note the simple point: that it is only those publishers who pay authors
who would face a prisoner’s dilemma if copyright were lacking. In a world without
post-disclosure legal rights, publishers who pay authors are the ones who face ru-
inous price competition at the hands nonpaying competitive copyists. Publishers
who don’t pay authors are already able to price at a low level.
In sum: dissemination is important to Progress. Copyright aids dissemination by
inducing creation of the things to be disseminated and inducing disseminators to pay
creators. The crucial fulcrum is the creative author. By themselves, dissemination
industries need to prove why they need legal protection against imitation any more
(and no less) than do other industries.
4. Publisher involvement in copyright: history and experience
Publishers do profit from copyright. Given any gain to be reaped by cooperation,
it is always possible for one or the other party to obtain a larger share because
of factors such as bargaining strength, greater knowledge, negotiation skills, or
uniqueness. Aside from ‘star’ authors, like movie stars20 and best-selling novelists,
19I am indebted to Richard Watt for the ‘agency’ analogy.
20Actors are authors. Acting is a creative activity protected via the copyright in audio-visual works
(17 USC §102(6)), the copyright in pantomimes (§102(4)), and the copyright in sound recordings
(§102(7)) . See also Kastenmeier et al. (1976) which explains the grant of copyright protection
to “pantomimes and choreographic works”, and Mannion v. Coors, 377 F.Supp.2d 444 (S.D.N.Y.
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it is likely that more monetary gains from author-publisher deals accrue to the
publishers than to the authors. But these real world facts say nothing about why
copyright was created in the first instance, or about whether copyright would be
justified today if it served solely to increase publisher revenues.
That disseminators profit from copyright explains their involvement in copy-
right lobbying. But when courts consider the sources of legitimacy for a challenged
statute, no decision I have ever read lets its answer rest on ‘whose pressure pro-
duced the statute’. (Admittedly, it’s a short step from “who put pressure on” to
“whom did Congress mean to benefit,” but if the Constitution picks a limited set of
beneficiaries for a particular form of assistance, then Congress isn’t free to choose).
In short, it is no wonder that publishers have profited from copyright (and of
course, some disseminators also profit from absence of copyright).21 It is thus also no
wonder than disseminators are involved in lobbying. Neither phenomenon suggests
that copyright law should serve disseminator interests.
5. The presence of dissemination and publication in copyright
statutes and doctrines
A third reason for the Court’s error is the undeniable fact that dissemination
has always had an important place in American copyright law. Most important for
the Golan Court was the pre-1978 rule that subjected American copyright law to
a great divide whose border was publication.22 State copyright, termed ‘common-
law copyright’,23 governed a work prior to publication. After publication, federal
statutory copyright law governed the work.
Publication definitionally involved distribution of copies; mere disclosure by oral
communication would not be “publication” no matter how far an oral broadcast
reached. In the days when common-law copyright was born, an oral communication
would not reach far. Technologies like tape recording and electronic broadcasting
were unknown, and exact note-taking difficult. So unpublished works were largely
private works, or works only known to a limited group.
Also important to some defenders of the Court’s position might be the portion
of the copyright statute that grants copyright owners a right to control the dissem-
ination of copies. In the first US copyright statute of 1790, that was the exclusive
right to “vend”; today it is the “exclusive right of distribution”.
2005), which provides that an important basis for granting copyright protection in photographs
is the creativity involved in “create[ing] the scene or subject to be photographed”.
21For example, photocopy machinery is more valuable the more works that can be copied free of
legal restraint.
22The publication-based distinction between unpublished (state) and published (federal) copyright
laws was abolished by the 1976 Copyright Act, whose provisions became effective January 1, 1978.
23The same terminology applied whether the state copyright law originated from caselaw or
statute.
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5.1. Publication as a border between federal copyright and state common-
law copyright. The Court’s reliance on the pre-1978 publication rule (that pub-
lication divided federal from state copyright) is puzzling. As mentioned, that rule
evolved in old economies that lacked sound recording or broadcast technologies, and
in such economies access to works was usually quite limited until an authorized gen-
eral dissemination of copies occurred.24 It would therefore have been hard for the
public to gain access to an unpublished creative work without violating some kind
of non-copyright law (Gordon, 1989). To make a copy, the potential copyist would
have to violate trespass law to enter the author’s home or office in order to see the
original; violate conversion and theft prohibitions in order to take the document;
or violate the contract or confidential relation under whose shelter he was given a
copy. It thus makes sense that pre-dissemination, state law was allowed to create
a right against copying to fill in whatever gaps in control that the established laws
of trespass, conversion, theft and contract left open. Relatedly, common-law copy-
right lowered the incentive to fill the gaps by engaging in wasteful self-help.25 State
control over copying in such a context was not much of an additional incursion on
liberty.
But after publication, the only way for an author to control dissemination would
be through the long arm of special copyright laws. And at that point, public liberty
would indeed be at stake, and significantly so. Recall that all the famous Anglo-
American cases addressing whether copyright existed at common law, or whether
instead copyright needed a statutory base, arose on the issue of whether copyright
could exist without statute after publication.
Before publication, common-law copyright was uncontroversial. After publica-
tion, only nationwide rights to control copying and use made sense. It was consider-
ation of factors such as potential threats to free speech, incursions on competition,
24A caveat: I must admit that some unpublished oral works, such as prominent sermons, speeches,
and oral judicial opinions, were reported to the public in organs such as newspapers or commercial
court reports. Some of these reports may have been verbatim (exact) transcripts of the texts
delivered. To the extent they were ‘unauthorized’ distributions, such disseminations would not
have robbed the speeches’ authors of their common-law copyrights, even though the general public
had some access to the texts. The reason for the oddity (that state law could continue to protect
some texts that had entered the public discourse) probably lies with the harsh consequences that
would have followed from treating unauthorized publications as divesting common-law copyright.
As Arthur Leff taught us, no law exactly matches any rationale with exactitude. See Leff (1974)
(and yes, I see the applicability of Leff ’s point to the whole quarrel over what copyright ‘means’).
25This is also how trade secret laws operate. Like common-law copyright, they are state-
created gap fillers. Trade secrecy laws are known also to have a special virtue of pre-
venting wasteful arms-races; see Friedman et al., (1991). I argue that copyright, too, pre-
vents wasteful expenditure. Without copyright, publishers might resort to expensive self-
help options that lead to arms races, like issuing the below-cost ‘strike editions’ men-
tioned by Breyer (1970). Copyright can also eliminate some of the incentive to develop
and adopt physical restraints on copying such as digital encryption and ‘digital rights man-
agement’ (DRM), also known as ‘digital restrictions management.’ See “What is DRM?”,
http://www.defectivebydesign.org/what_is_drm_digital_restrictions_management
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and the scope of behavior that crossed state lines, that made federal intervention
the only kind of intervention that made sense.
So no wonder federal law before 1978 usually premised federal copyright upon
proof of publication.26 Only after publication was federal protection (and federal
limits on protection, such as limited duration27) needed. The jurisdictional decision
to use publication to divide federal from state copyright law gives no evidence
for the proposition that serving publishers’ interests was among the goal of the
Constitution’s Framers. Nor is any such evidence provided by the decision to bring
unpublished works into the federal realm once recording technologies had advanced.
When tape recorders and broadcast technologies became ubiquitous, the notion that
oral presentations could not ‘publish’ became absurd.
5.2. The exclusive right over distribution. The U.S. right of distribution reads
as follows (17 USC §106(3)):
“Subject to [fair use and other limitations including the first sale
doctrine],28 the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive
rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
. . .
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted
work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by
rental, lease, or lending;”
26Even pre-1978, some kinds of works could obtain federal copyright by applying for it, and did
not need to wait for publication. The 1976 Copyright Act, largely to avoid wrangles over what
constituted ‘publication’, brought all other unpublished works within the federal umbrella so long
as the works were written down, tape-recorded, or otherwise “fixed” under the authority of the
copyright owner. The 1976 Act became effective in 1978.
One wrinkle arises from the fact that under common-law copyright, duration of unpublished
works was perpetual. Once they were covered by federal law, however, their copyrights would
last only for a finite number of years. A challenge for my perspective is how, when Congress
drew all unpublished and ‘fixed’ works under the federal mantle, the new statute encouraged the
publication of long-unpublished manuscripts, songs and other art works: Congress promised an
extra term of years if they were published promptly (17 USC §303). While not ‘proving’ anything
about what the Framers themselves intended, section 303 might suggest that the 1976 Congress
took encouragement of dissemination as legitimately within copyright’s purview.
27Common-law copyright (i.e., state copyright) was perpetual.
28As the statute notes, there are many limitations on the distribution right. Most important
is the first sale doctrine, embodied in section 109(a), a principle also known as “exhaustion.”
Section 109(a) provides that, “Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a
particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such
owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of
the possession of that copy or phonorecord.” Note that the first sale doctrine by its terms only
immunizes the resale of “lawfully made” copies. It has no applicability to unlawfully made copies,
such as magazines containing plagiarized or otherwise unauthorized copyrighted text, or canvases
bearing forged copies of copyrighted paintings.
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The role of the distribution right is simple to explain, and has nothing to do with
protecting publishers per se. Without a distribution right, copyright law’s grant of
rights to authors would be largely toothless.
Without the right over distribution, forgers and other copyists could sell their
unlawful copies to unknowing retailers and then scamper, leaving the retailers (the
only ones left on scene to sue) immune to judgment. Neither of the two estab-
lished copyright doctrines of secondary liability, namely contributory liability and
secondary liability, would reach them.29 Or the copyists might not flee, but might
spend their profits before they are caught. This would again leave retail sellers
the only entities capable of paying a copyright judgment. Without the distribution
right, again those unknowing retail sellers would be immune from suit. Moreover,
without the ‘distribution right’ there might have been no basis on which to stop
the retailers from selling the copies30 and thereby increasing the harm the authors
would suffer.
Admittedly, had there been no distribution right, the doctrines of secondary lia-
bility would certainly have evolved to make distributors liable and to enable authors
to enjoin the distributor’s sales of illegally-made copies. This kind of expansion of
secondary-liability doctrine is precisely what happened in the Grokster case. There
defendant peer-to-peer computer programs enabled unlawful copying by third par-
ties. Essentially because the programs provided the most vulnerable “bottleneck”
to stop the copying,31 to snare them the Supreme Court added a new type of sec-
ondary liability (‘inducement’ liability) to the list of doctrines which could make a
non-copyist liable.
But rather than twisting doctrines of secondary liability to fit, it makes more
sense to cut the Gordian knot (may I now call it the Gordon knot?) and simply make
29Under copyright law, vicarious liability requires proof that the defendant had some control over
the violative act. If a retailer had no control over the copying, he would therefore not be liable
under vicarious liability. An alternative theory of secondary liability is contributory liability.
However, in copyright such liability will be imposed only if the proof shows the defendant had
knowledge of the infringing activity. An unknowing retailer would thus not be subject to secondary
liability.
30It is true that once a retailer knows a work was unlawfully made, he or she has knowledge, and
knowledge is a component of contributory liability. But for contributory liability to attach, the
knowledge must combine with some assistance (some contribution) to the infringing activity. If
the infringing activity is only the copying — if distributing an unlawfully copied work is not by
itself a direct infringement — then the retailer is not contributing to an infringement. Thus, under
established secondary-liability law, and without the distribution right, copyright owners would
have been unable to stop distribution of forged or plagiarized material even after the distributor
learned the truth of the copies’ origin.
31MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). The defendant had provided
software that enabled others to unlawfully download and upload copyrighted works to the internet.
Wrote the majority: “When a widely shared service or product is used to commit infringement, it
may be impossible to enforce rights in the protected work effectively against all direct infringers,
the only practical alternative being to go against the distributor of the copying device for secondary
liability . . .”.
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all distributors of unlawful copies liable. Cutting the Gordian tangle of secondary-
liability doctrines is what the distribution right accomplishes.
Because ignorance and good faith are not defenses to a civil copyright action,
the distribution right puts the burden of inquiry and insurance on parties probably
able to bear it. It further ensures that copyright owners can obtain from a retailer
some share of the profits made knowingly or unknowingly from their work.
So yes, there is a right of distribution. But its function is to assist authors, not
distributors. Once explained, the existence of a 106(3) right of distribution should
stop confusing observers into thinking that distributors themselves are the subject
of the statute’s solicitude.
6. Publisher claims based on their own efforts
6.1. Nature of the claims. There are several arguments that proponents could
raise in support of the more modest idea that distributors’ interests are part of
copyright’s legitimate goals — or at least, the idea that their interest need some form
of protection against copying. For instance, entirely apart from their investments in
creators (such as the large advances commanded by successful authors), publishers
could be said to invest in typesetting and typography; in the infrastructure of
advertisement and distribution; or in the machinery of choice and the making of
reputations.
6.2. Why the claims fail.
6.2.1. In general. Most of these claims run into difficulties fairly quickly. For in-
stance, in the days of the Framers, typesetting was a labor-intensive and time-
consuming process, and the lack of photocopy machines made it impossible to free-
ride on typesetting: any duplicator would have to put in the same amount of effort.
And typefaces are excluded from the sphere of copyright.32 Moreover, manuscripts
today are easily scanned and transformed into digital form, often using industry,
and world-wide, standard typefaces, which means that both original publishers and
purported free-riders might contribute little or nothing in the way of typesetting or
typography.
As to investment in advertising or distribution infrastructure, such overhead
costs accrue to any business with a wide market. Proof is needed if we are to
believe they do not apply equally to book publishers, electronics, athletic brands,
foods, and even service industries like airlines. It is difficult to see why publishers
or other distributors should be able to claim special protections — in effect, special
subsidies — for these common costs of doing business.
32The Copyrigh Act does not extend copyright protection to typefaces. In its report, the House
Judiciary Committee explicitly stated that it “[had] considered, but chosen to defer, the possibility
of protecting the design of typefaces.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 at 55 (1976).
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Other arguments, such as pleas based on the high advances and royalties that
distributors pay to ‘star’ creators (see Barnett, 2013, pg. 15),33 are not truly
arguments in favor of special solicitude for distributors. Rather, like traditional
copyright justifications they turn on rewarding or incentivizing a creator. The only
difference is that rather than the public directly paying the artist a high price for
her work, the public pays the distributor, which in turn pays the artist for the
right to exact that high price from the public. Thus, the crux of the justification
is the claim of the artist, whose economic argument in turn is a purported need to
incentivize creative activity.
6.2.2. Evaluative judgments, cherry-picking, and the Price System. The argument
that holds the most water is, perhaps, that publishers make a unique and costly
contribution by evaluating and choosing which works to publish. Further, it is
sometimes argued, if a publisher publishes ten books, and only one of them is a
hit, the publisher can still use the profits from that one to subsidize the other nine,
thus increasing the overall choice available to the public and increasing the chances
that the next, latent bestseller will get the exposure it needs to take off. However,
the publisher’s argument might continue, if its profits are leeched by cherry-picking
competitors who are able to copy and publish only bestsellers, its business model
would be destroyed.
This argument has been foundational to some pro-distributor views of copyright.
Most notably, Jonathan Barnett consistently emphasizes the evaluative function
that disseminators play. For example, he argues that (Barnett, 2013):
“[T]he intermediary-based case for copyright survives the advent of
low-cost, high-quality digital technologies for cultural production
and distribution . . . . The reason is simple but overlooked. Even
dramatic reductions in copying and distribution costs borne by the
producers of creative goods make little difference in, and actually
exacerbate, the search and evaluation costs borne by consumers of
those goods and hence, the marketing costs borne by the producers
and distributors of those goods. Those costs leave in place the high
risk and much of the capital intensity attendant to the production
and consumption of mass-cultural goods and preserve a vital role
for the large intermediary in cultural goods markets.”(Emphasis
added).
Yet evaluation of opportunities is what every business does. . . and what every
business shares with others, willingly or not, through price signals.
33In fact, all arguments based on the ‘superstar’ phenomenon (such as those made by Barnett,
2103, pp. 16, 42-44) hinge on the role of the singer, actor, writer, or other creative person, all of
whom are ‘authors’ in the legal sense.
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Barnett’s analysis disregards the fact that signaling the competition about one’s
success is an essential and inevitable part of a decentralized market system’s ability
to allocate resources. Ordinarily the function is carried out by pricing. If there is a
shortage of water in Austin, Texas, then the price of water will rise and out-of-state
suppliers will be motivated to enter the market, increasing the supply and lowering
the price. A place on the bestseller list is a similar signal of high demand. It tells
competitors that that there is a spot in the market that they should move in to
exploit.
6.2.3. Need for comparative institutional analysis. Granted, in any market there
needs to be some lead time of exclusivity, to allow innovators and first-movers to
recoup their extra effort.34 But this is true of everything from hybrid cars to cough
medicine. This is not a new counterargument. Indeed, as Justice Breyer commented
in his Golan dissent (Golan, 132 S.Ct. at 909-10), disseminators’ claims to need
special protection “can be made by distributers [sic] of all sorts of goods, ranging
from kiwifruit to Swedish furniture, [and] has little if anything to do with the
nonrepeatable costs of initial creation, which is the special concern of copyright
protection.”. So the burden is still on the publishers to show why they require so
vast a lead time as the life of the author plus an additional seventy years (which
is what copyright gives), and simply cannot function with only the lead time that
is natural to the market (that is, the time it takes for competitors to accurately
identify and duplicate a success). This process cannot be instantaneous; copying
‘the hits’ requires taking the time to determine what really is a hit (as opposed to
a flash in the pan), and the hit may reach its peak too quickly to match profitably.
In fact, Barnett himself (Barnett, 2013, pg. 31) points out that the popularity of
hits declines quickly: few become “‘classics’ for which demand persists beyond a
single season.”
This raises another reason to doubt the strength of the disseminator argument.
If big hits usually only remain popular for one season, then a few months or a year
of exclusive protection should be sufficient to maintain the business model — hardly
the author’s life and seventy years beyond. Moreover, copyright extends protection
not only against exact duplicators but against all sorts of derivative and subsidiary
acts; thus, even if an argument can be made for granting distributors protection
against intra-industry competitors, Barnett fails to show why copyright’s sweeping
scope of exclusions is the proper vehicle for that protection.
34Lead time is the gap in time between when an initial distributor puts its product on the market
and the first date thereafter that a competitor can put out a duplicate. Lead time may be a
natural consequence of the market or may be the result of legal mechanisms, as in the case of
copyright, which “extends natural lead-time effects during the statutory term of protection ...”
(Frischmann and Moylan, 2000).
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As Barnett’s arguments are interesting, let us take one more look at his approach.
One of his core arguments seems to be that the non-authorial contributions of
distributors “are far more capital-intensive than the initial act of creation, require[]
skills, equipment, and infrastructure that are not always easily accessible, and are
undertaken by [profit-motivated] entities.” (Barnett, 2013, pg. 8). Even if true,
it is not clear what the claim proves without comparison to other industries and
alternative modes of meeting disseminators’ capital needs.
7. Conclusions
The US Congress has enacted expansions of copyright which arguably impose
high social costs and generate little incentives for authorial creativity. When the
two most expansive statutes were challenged as unconstitutional, the US Supreme
Court rebuffed the challenges, partly on the supposed ground that copyright law
could legitimately seek to promote non-authorial interests; apparently, Congress
could enact provisions aiming to support noncreative disseminative activities such
as publishing, or restoring and distributing old film stock, even if authorial incen-
tives were not served.
Such an error might have arisen because of three phenomena (in economics, his-
tory, and law, respectively) that might easily be misunderstood but which, when
unpacked, no longer lead plausibly to a stand-alone embrace of disseminator inter-
ests. The present article comes to the following conclusions in regard each of these
phenomena:
• The first deceptive phenomenon lies in the way that economic tools such as
the Arrow paradox focus our attention on how dissemination must occur
for social value to arise. This article admits that disseminators’ crucial role
deserves appreciation — but argues that their role needs copyright only to
the extent that authors need disseminators.
• The second deceptive phenomenon is the strong role that disseminators
and related reprographic industries have historically played in the copyright
legislative process. The present article points out that having a financial
interest in legislation is not equivalent to being a proper beneficiary of the
legislation, particularly when the enabling Constitutional language seems
not to embrace such post-hoc scramblers for rent.
• The third potentially deceptive phenomenon is the way that publication
plays a role in copyright law and doctrine: notably, before 1978 ‘publication’
divided state copyright from federal copyright, and today ‘publication’ is
one of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights. (It is part of the right “to
distribute”). Here we point out that the division of state copyright from
federal was rooted not in the desire to encourage publication but rather
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in the need for national regulation and limitation once a work could be
accessed by the general population.
• As for the right “to distribute”, the article reveals the right as functioning
essentially as kind of simplified secondary liability, that is, a convenient way
for authors to enforce their rights against entities who have both ability to
pay, and some ability to control the harm done by copyists.
Some commentators who defend the Court’s approach do so by pointing to costly
evaluative search tasks undertaken by disseminators. This article points out that
offering a ‘hit’ book or movie (the result of an evaluative process) signals success
in much the same way as high prices signal success. Since the market system
relies on competitors being able to free-ride on the price signals (and evaluation
of opportunities) generated by others, a high burden of persuasion rests on any
argument that would outlaw competitors from following success-signals.
Only a comparative institutional analysis can show whether disseminator indus-
tries need help that is more or different than other industries need, and whether,
if such help is needed, copyright and its roughly 95 years of lead-time-advantage is
really an appropriate tool.
The Supreme Court probably erred in singling out the interests of non-creative
disseminators as being capable of providing legitimacy to controversial copyright
statutes. Such an error is understandable. Copyright economic theory puts empha-
sis on dissemination; disseminators have long profited from copyright and have long
been involved in lobbying for copyright; and several doctrines seem to put empha-
sis on publication. But once these phenomena are examined, it becomes clear that
they do not support the Court’s recent interpretation. In my view it is improper
to use the interests of noncreative disseminators to legitimate counter-productive
provisions such as term extension or restoration of expired copyrights.
Challenges could be raised to my position. Most importantly, if only such dis-
semination as serves authorial interests is relevant, how do I justify my support for
extending fair use to non-creative copying? (Gordon, 1982). And, if only authorial
interests matter, does that invalidate seemingly sensible rules like the one that pro-
motes public access to ancient unpublished works by giving their copyright owners
an extended copyright term35 if they publish by a certain date? These issues pose
important challenges, and are grist for another day’s milling.
But what does not yet pose a significant challenge is the current scholarship
arguing that disseminator industries benefit from copyright. That scholarship con-
tains a valuable first step toward understanding what the economic effects would be
of limiting copyright to the incentivizing of authors. But the steps after it are the
35See footnote 20 above.
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crucial ones, such as resolving whether disseminators need or deserve monopolies
more than do other industries; whether disseminators could profit at less social cost
by non-copyright modes of assistance; whether the benefits to disseminators from
governmental intervention would be outweighed by the costs the intervention im-
poses on others (such as authors)36; and whether, if there were no need to pay the
‘creatives’ — the writers and actors and singers and composers — the disseminators
would have much of a claim at all.37
The US Constitution speaks not only of a goal — Progress — but also of a means:
grants of exclusive rights to authors and inventors. The British inaugural copyright
statute may have originated through the pressure of the Stationers’ Company but
it too granted rights only to authors. The burden of proof rests on those who would
dislodge copyright from its traditional focus.
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